EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A Program Evaluation of Afghan Logistics Structure and Customer Satisfaction in Special Operations

By William J. Richardson

Spanning a period of more than 15 years, the challenges surrounding Afghan logistics have been a leading topic of Coalition Forces efforts in the war on terrorism. The direction for this project focused primarily towards logistics in special operations forces. Specifically, this research was conducted to examine the effectiveness of the Afghan National Army (ANA) central supply depot (CSD) and to determine if requirements in special operations were adequately supported. The rationale behind the importance of this research stemmed from years of complaints and reports from coalition advisors and Afghan counterparts while operating in all six corps regions throughout Afghanistan.

Known as the General Support Battalion (GSB), The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) relies on this single unit to receive all supplies from the CSD. Therefore, the typology utilized to evaluate the relationship between the CSD and GSB consisted of a program evaluation for effectiveness. With this approach, data was empirically investigated for customer satisfaction within the GSB regarding transactions with the CSD, as well as how well ANASOC was accomplishing their missions as a whole. The researcher utilized the two instruments of existing organizational data and scaled surveys for obtaining primary data. These instruments provided the researcher substantial measurements in physical supplies coming from the CSD, as well as the data needed to better understand the CSD’s organizational structure as it relates to customer satisfaction in the GSB.

The researcher conducted this project by collecting and analyzing a one-year supply of requests and receipts in the timespan of 1 January 2015 through 31 December 2015 from the
GSB. Also, statistical analysis was utilized with this data to help determine the level of support provided by the CSD. Secondly, two scaled surveys were administered to evaluate the CSD’s customer satisfaction and organizational structure. The non-probability sampling technique of purposive sampling was utilized by the researcher to select 25 participants. These selections were intentionally non-random and based on their jobs while serving in key positions within the GSB, CSD, and coalition advising teams.

Major findings within this research concluded the Central Supply Depot (CSD) adequately supported special operations with effective resupply with the exception of ammunition in areas experiencing heavy conflict. The CSD maintained 90% fill-rates for supplies during the entire year. However, the research uncovered several systemic challenges where efficiency can be gained through the implementation of five reforms. These reforms include the strategic placement of additional coalition advisors at the Class II and Class IX warehouses at the CSD, as well as the Material Management Command (MMC), updating the CoreIMS logistics computer system to automate the MOD-14 process, better prepare the CSD for the yearly summer Taliban offensive, request fuel only in larger quantities to reduce corruption, and increase communications capability in provinces such as Helmand and Kunduz for units residing farther from the Kabul region.

Lastly, this research focused on Afghan logistics below the national level; however, many problems were also uncovered at the ministerial level. The researcher suggests that power should be relinquished from the ministry back down to the Material Management Command (MMC) for MOD-14 requisition approval. Ultimately, this would speed the process by a minimum of two weeks, and provide corps commands more efficient and accurate resupply.
A Program Evaluation of Afghan Logistics
Structure and Customer Satisfaction in Special Operations

MSA 699 Project Report

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
For the Degree of
Master of Science in Administration
(Concentration in General Administration)

by
William J. Richardson

Project Instructor:
Dr. Gordon Elwell

October 22, 2016
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. 4

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. 5

CHAPTER

I. Problem Definition ......................................................................................................... 6
   Background ....................................................................................................................... 6
   Research Problem .......................................................................................................... 8
   Research Objective ........................................................................................................ 10
   Scope / Delimitations ..................................................................................................... 11

II. Review of the Related Literature .................................................................................. 13
   Introduction of the Literature ....................................................................................... 13
   Presentation of the Literature ....................................................................................... 14
      Organizational structure ............................................................................................ 14
      Document processing .................................................................................................. 18
      Accountability ............................................................................................................. 20
   Summary of the Literature ............................................................................................ 22

III. Research Methodology ................................................................................................. 24
    Research Approach ....................................................................................................... 24
    Data Collection Approach and Procedures ................................................................. 25
       Data to be Collected ................................................................................................... 25
       Primary research question data details .................................................................... 25
       Research sub-question data details ........................................................................ 25
    Data Collection Procedures ........................................................................................ 27
       Target Population ..................................................................................................... 29
       Sample Details ........................................................................................................ 30
       Instrumentation ........................................................................................................ 30
       Procedures ................................................................................................................ 31
       Timing ......................................................................................................................... 32
       Proposed Approach for Data Analysis and Synthesis .............................................. 32
       Methodological Limitations ...................................................................................... 34

IV. Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 36
    Data Presentation and Analysis ................................................................................... 36
    Data Analysis Summary ............................................................................................... 47

V. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations .......................................................... 49
   Summary ....................................................................................................................... 50
   Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 52
   Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 55
   Areas for future research and study ............................................................................. 59
REFERENCES …………………………………………………………………………………. 63

APPENDICES ………………………………………………………………………………... 66
  Appendix A: Survey Transmittal Letter Instructions……………………………………….. 66
  Appendix B: Survey Questions……………………………………………………………... 67
  Appendix C: Permission to Conduct Study………………………………………………. 69
  Appendix D: RRA Approval Email…………………………………………………………. 70
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1: CSD survey questions statistical analysis</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2: Survey responses for larger scale missions</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>ANA modern logistics supply</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>CSD organizational structure mean and standard deviation</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Total requisitions</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>Monthly fill-rate percentages</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>Supply requests by month</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>Diesel fuel histogram results</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7</td>
<td>Logistics shortfalls in combines operations</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8</td>
<td>MOD decree 4.0</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9</td>
<td>Actual MOD-14 process chart</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Problem Definition

"As Afghan National Security Forces look to eradicate the Taliban and provide safety and stability for the people of Afghanistan, a key to their continued success hinges on their ability to order, transport, and receive mission-essential equipment and supplies across the country."

SGT Clay Beyersdorfer at ISAF Regional Command South, September 2014

Background

The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) currently consists of two brigades, a Military Intelligence Battalion (MIK), a General Support Battalion (GSB), a Garrison Support Unit (GSU), training center, and a Division Headquarters with over 10,000 assigned personnel (Schroden, Norman, Meyerle, Asfura-Heim, & Rosenau, 2014). ANASOC has the responsibility to recruit, man, train, equip, and employ all Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces (ANASOF) to conduct operations in support of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s national security strategy. These operations consist of a full spectrum of missions including everything from counter-insurgency operations to special purpose attacks. ANASOC units stretch throughout the entire country of Afghanistan and conduct special operations in all six regional commands including the national capital region of Kabul.

An organization with a footprint as large as ANASOC’s requires an impressive amount of sustainment and anticipatory logistics to remain an operationally capable fighting force. Equipment within ANASOC is comprised of over 55,000 key enablers for all critical items including up-armored vehicles, weapons, and communications equipment (MTOE, 2014). Each of these key enablers also consists of many more items expanding across all nine classes of supply required to maintain this equipment over time. Although tables of authorized allowances
do not include basic items such as uniforms, office supplies, meals ready to eat (MRE) for combat operations, fuel, and ammunition, all of these items are supplied by Kabul’s Central Supply Depot (CSD). When the full scope of the CSD’s responsibility is considered, the ramifications become immeasurable.

Each battalion within ANASOC dwelling outside the national Kabul region is logistically supported by the Regional Logistics Support Center (RLSC) for the regional command they are conducting operations in. ANASOC units within the Kabul region are sustained directly by the Kabul Central Supply Depot (CSD). The six RLSC’s within the aforementioned commands throughout Afghanistan receive their supplies directly from the CSD as well. These Corps level commands consist of 209th Corps in the North, 201st Corps in the East, 203rd Corps near the capital region, 205th and 215th Corps in the South, and 207th Corps in the West. Additionally, the CSD has the tremendous responsibility to support all Ministry of Defense (MOD) entities in the theater of operations. These include the Ministry of Defense General Staff, Ground Forces Command, National Engineer Brigade, Logistics Command, Afghan National Army Training Education Command (ANATEC), ANA Recruiting Command (ANAREC), Medical Command (MEDCOM), and the ANA National Defense University (ANDU) (MTOE, 2014).
When building and sustaining an army such as the Afghan National Army, the associated costs can be difficult for American taxpayers to bear. Sustainment equals dollars, and this war was paid for almost completely through borrowing. Borrowing raises the US budget deficit, increases the national debt, and has many other economic effects such as growing interest rates. The United States also must pay interest on the borrowed money. The interest paid on Pentagon spending alone from 2001 through 2013 caps $316 billion in current dollars (Brown, 2011). Hence, understanding challenges associated within just one Afghan Special Forces division with regards to sustainment and resupply of the force represents a significant issue worthy of research on multiple levels. Previous popular and trade research studies easily date Afghan Special Forces logistics challenges back to 2007 when unique approaches were experimented while “doing more with less” (Manganaro, 2007). As the primary procurement resource for all requisitions in logistics within the entire Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Central Supply Depot is in a position to greatly impact the ability of many organizations both positively and negatively to effectively accomplish their mission.

Research Problem

In November of 2013, ANASOC Division leadership recognized the need to develop an internal mechanism to logistically support the battalions within ANASOC on a contingency basis when the CSD and various RLSC depots could not (Weitz, 2013). When conducting battlefield circulations throughout Afghanistan to speak directly with his subordinate battalions, the Commanding General (CG) of ANASOC was consistently asked for assistance with regards to sustainment needs. Complaints would vary from problems with the supply requisition signature process to the lack of support provided from the various regional RLSCs. Hence, ANASOC’s very own General Support Battalion (GSB) was born. The commander created the GSB to serve
as an immediate sustainment relief mechanism for emergency and contingent type operations. The GSB was created to provide added transportation capability, maintenance capability, and warehouse supply operations. The GSB also has a General Support Company (GSC) consisting of the engineer, cook, and fuel sections (MTOE, 2014). The idea behind the GSB was to pick-up supplies directly from the CSD in Kabul when they could not provide resupply from their own internal warehouse, and push to the outlying battalions who were not receiving proper support from their regional corps depots. To perform this mission effectively, the internal maintenance capability became a critical factor to the success of the GSB.

Ultimately, all supply requisitions are filled through the CSD. For ANASOC’s GSB to be successful in their mission to provide contingent resupply, the ability to draw these provisions became the primary focus. Therefore, the primary research questions and associated sub-questions to be examined in this research are outlined as follows:

**Primary research question**

- What is the relationship between the Afghan National Army (ANA) Central Supply Depot’s organizational structure and customer satisfaction in the ANASOC General Support Battalion (GSB)?

**Associated sub-questions**

- What factors comprise the CSD’s organizational structure within the Afghan National Army?
- What are the primary aspects of the General Support Battalion’s customer satisfaction within ANASOC?
- How does the GSB’s customer satisfaction and organizational structure within the Central Supply Depot interact within ANASOC?
The independent variable within the primary research question is the organizational structure of the Central Supply Depot, and the dependent variable is the customer satisfaction within the GSB. This research explored these variables through further examination of the three listed sub-questions. The importance of understanding the organizational structure within the CSD was critical to determining the feasibility of supported unit’s success when conducting supply requisition transactions. This research examined if this particular structure created an environment conducive to customer satisfaction in ANASOC’s General Support Battalion. Lastly, the role this interaction exhibited between the CSD and GSB was reviewed for the purpose of determining the positive or negative effects it had towards supporting mission requirements within the ANASOC Division.

**Research Objective**

The research results and recommendations for improvement will be written and presented to a variety of stakeholders to include the ANASOC Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) Commander, the ANASOC Afghan Commanding General, and the Special Operations Joint Task Force Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) General Staff Logistics Officer. The purpose of this research is to communicate information concerning current mandated CSD policies, explain how this relates to current support provided to the ANASOC GSB, identify underlying causes of problems associated with receiving supplies from the CSD, and discuss actions that can be taken to address them. The conception of ANASOC’s GSB was based on the very survival of the ANASOC organization as a whole. This research will increase awareness, and allow for actions to be implemented for improving the ANASOC GSB’s performance and outcomes related to conducting logistics operations with the CSD. Ultimately, this will better serve America’s war effort and its taxpayers.
Scope / Delimitations

The target population for this research consisted of 15 personnel within the purposive sample. This includes ten Afghan and five U.S. service members with specific institutional knowledge on the supply requisition process. These 15 personnel include the key leadership and logistics staff from both the General Support Battalion (GSB) and ANASOC division headquarters. Within the GSB, key leadership participants will include the GSB Commanding officer, GSB Sergeant Major, GSB Support Operations officer, GSB Central Supply Depot Liaison officer. The various signature card authorities within the GSB will include major property book items (CLVII), ammunition and repair parts (CLV and CLIX), food, clothing, and personal items (CLI, II, and VI), medical supplies (CLVIII), and construction material (CLIV). From the ANASOC Division Headquarters, the G4 logistics officer, and assigned U.S. mentors will be surveyed.

This study examines the support relationship between the ANA’s largest supply depot in support of the Ministry of Defense and the ANASOC General Support Battalion. The ANASOC division is an extremely large, complex, and multi-million dollar organization consisting of many subordinate battalions. Although the Central Supply Depot (CSD) supports all of the Ministry of Defense (MOD), this research will only focus on the relationship between the CSD in relation to one specific battalion within ANASOC. Only customer satisfaction will be measured in this study, and other dependent variables such as costs and procurement timelines will not be included in this research. Information with regards to support provided to previously mentioned entities within the Ministry of Defense will not be included.

The ANASOC GSB has only been an active Afghan unit for three years; therefore, data collected will only focus on the GSB’s relationship with the CSD for the past calendar year.
beginning in January 2015. Given the young status of the unit, older performance data is not obtainable for diagnosing current sustainment challenges. Other aspects such as influences on Afghan logistics by coalition forces at the ministerial level are not evaluated in this particular effort. Specifically, issues concerning how the CSD receives supplies for distribution to supported units.
Chapter 2: Review of the Related Literature

Introduction to the Literature

The objective of the following literature review is to synthesize associated scholarly works in order to better understand the challenges associated with the Afghan National Army’s logistics and sustainment structure. Currently, the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) has a General Support Battalion (GSB) that was created for the sole purpose of providing contingent resupply when outlying regional corps commands could not. The ANASOC division currently has ten battalions spread throughout all six of the different regional corps commands in Afghanistan. The corps for each region has the responsibility for providing logistical support to the ANASOC battalions dwelling within their various battle spaces.

Each of the six corps commands have a supply depot commonly referred to as the Regional Logistics Supply Center (RLSC) from which supplies are rendered to all units within that region. All six corps RLSC’s fall under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and receive their supplies from Kabul’s Central Supply Depot (CSD). Therefore, this literature review will examine peer reviewed journal articles concerning the current state of MOD logistics with regards to the support provided to them. This will ultimately provide insight to the level of support provided to ANASOC units since the GSB has the responsibility to sustain ANASOC’s subordinate battalions. Extensive literature exists concerning this particular research issue; therefore, topics will be presented in three sub-sections to best illuminate the findings. These sub-sections include: (a) Organizational Structure (b) Document Processing and (c) accountability.
Presentation of the Literature

Organizational structure. One of the key focuses for this research was the organizational structure of the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) current logistics system. Van Dyck (2016) noted the current process as lengthy, prone to human error, and providing little feedback to lower level units. Part of the problem with logistics and resupply is that the ANA has yet to stand up its own effective system as reported by McLeary (2009). This is still true today as repair parts are bought and supplied by the United States. Setting up an ANA logistics system that is capable of providing Soldiers with shelter, ammunition, food, clothing, and repair parts is one of the most perplexing challenges for coalition forces. Major General Richard Formica claims this challenge is typically brought on because the Afghan military does not plan well at most levels; they are more spontaneous (McLeary, 2009).

This is attributed as a result of the immediate need to train and field combat troops first. Only in more recent years has the ANA begun to field support units for logistical efforts, and the shift to improve their logistics processes have become the current initiative. Peter (2011) also recognizes logistics as the Afghan Army’s next major hurdle, and claims the ANA must establish the capability to effectively provide resupply if they are going to take over the security in Afghanistan. The ANA’s combat capability is well known among many U.S. soldiers who currently serve in Afghanistan. Peter (2011) discusses the importance that must now be placed on catching up the logistics capability within the Afghan Army. The Afghan military has been supplied largely in part by the U.S. and NATO forces. While trying to end this dependency for Afghan Soldiers who have become used to receiving anything they needed from U.S. Soldiers, a difficult challenge is faced. Peter (2011) notes that coalition forces along with their counterparts have worked hard to create a sustainment process that will ultimately make the ANA more
independent. This system is dependent upon Afghan Soldiers properly filling out supply requests through their chain of command as seen in most militaries. Although this resupply system is currently in place, the challenge is getting the Afghan Army to utilize it properly. Afghans express concerns over this system falling short as Americans withdraw from Afghanistan. Their air force is not operational, and the rugged terrain in Afghanistan wreaks havoc on their vehicles. According to Peter (2011), the Afghan reliance on foreign support will remain for years to come.

Stear (2012) noted the U.S. 204th Brigade Support Battalion’s (BSB) logistics training advisory efforts as requiring more than simply using teaching techniques. This team was tasked with ensuring that self-sustaining logistics were effective across the board. The 204th BSB identified a need to assist with weapons and vehicle maintenance. In doing so, they learned that the most common best practices for tracking, storing, receiving, and requesting supplies were not being utilized. The lack of Afghan logistical experience proved to be a much larger hurdle to overcome than expected. Stear (2012) explains the logistical organizational structure currently being used by the Afghans as a “push” logistics system, and this is what the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) wants to steer the Afghans away from. Basically, a push system is driven from the top down where the higher headquarters distributes bulk supplies based on its determination of what the units require. ISAF’s goal is to assist the ANA with establishing a “pull” logistical system. In this type of system, subordinate units develop sustainment needs based on their specific requirements, and then request them from the higher command. In order for the subordinate units to be properly funded, the higher headquarters must use this data forecast future requirements (Stear, 2012). To say the least, establishing this system has been extremely difficult for multiple reasons, which will be covered in subsequent sections of the literature review.
Hamilton, Holcomb, and Payne (2014) acknowledge ANA logisticians as having resiliency and ability to sustain their organizations when they absolutely have to. With regards to organizational structure, these researchers recommended that the U.S. Department of Defense place expert logistics advisors within the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD), as well as the six regional logistics support centers. Hamilton et al., (2014) believes these individuals should have specific knowledge concerning receipt and distribution processes from the Central Supply Depot (CSD). By having the correct advisors and the appropriate foreign funding, the ANA logistics challenges could become less. Given the fact that most deployments to Afghanistan are nine months or less, and the complexities of the Afghan logistics system take a long time to learn, this research believes that statement to be optimistic.

Former senior advisor to the Afghan MOD logistics office, Lieutenant Colonel Valeski, discussed difficulties while setting up a logistics system that was a good fit for the Afghan National Army. After discussing the new “pull” system with the MOD Afghan logistics officer, the Afghan officer stated “Okay, we will do what the coalition wants but when you leave, we are going back to the way we used to do it” (Valeski, 2012, p. 19). As noted by Valeski (2012), the logistics solution would be taken to the coalition leadership for implementation, and then presented to the ANA as the correct process to solve their sustainment problems. Afghans were not involved in the planning process, and Americans typically just tried to convince them that this was the proper way ahead. Afghan cultural realities were never built into the appropriate solution. As discussed previously in a different study, Valeski (2012) agrees the “pull” logistics system, where requests are driven from the bottom up, is the modern system that should be developed within the ANA. The problem is that a “pull” type logistics system is much more
complicated down at the unit level; however, it is much more efficient and effective in the long term with getting the correct supplies required.

Valeski (2012) points out a flaw in the implemented doctrine with the omission of information with regards to how supplies were to be properly allocated. Ultimately, without specific unit allocations, the Central Supply Depot (CSD) would simply deny customer requests. Critical items falling in the shoot, move, and communicate categories are all controlled by coalition forces and require a signed fielding plan through MOD before the CSD would give these items to requesting units. Further discussion on these bureaucratic challenges will take place later in the document processing sub-section. Valeski (2012) also claims that the CSD commander evaluates himself based on how full he keeps is warehouse. Therefore, it becomes easier to deny supply requests claiming the unit is not authorized to have the item or the request was not filled out correctly. MOD also requires the requests to come on original documents with no copies being allowed. With the ANA’s lack of an automated system utilizing programs such as Excel and Microsoft Word, many documents are lost during transport to the multiple offices requiring signatures on these requests. Valeski (2012) claims the odds of a request being filled are likely to be less than 20%.

Schroden, Norman, Meyerle, Asfura-Heim, and Rosenau (2014) address recommendations to the ANA logistical system challenges and offer the solution of reducing combat battalions, and substantially increasing support units to better enable future combat operations. These researchers claim the ANA will continue to endure significant capability gaps limiting their effectiveness without changing the structure. Specifically, Schroden et al., (2014) recommend reducing infantry battalions from 95 to 81 (15%) and increasing sustainment support forces from 26% to 36% overall ANA end-strength. Although the need for special operations
forces is significant, the ANA cannot support them at current manning levels. This recommended change would increase the likelihood of adequately sustaining the force.

Navy Lieutenant Commander Green (2014) discusses the importance of providing a persistent presence of trained Afghan special operations forces, but notes they are very capable yet expensive and cannot continue functioning without consistent partnered U.S. forces. Green (2014) also discusses the restrained budgetary environment creating difficulty when sustaining such a robust Afghan National Army. Although discussions between the U.S. and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) continue to debate the number of American troops in theater, Green (2014) recommends that the U.S. should insist on continuing future efforts with the Afghan government to further establish logistical efforts.

**Document processing.** This section will focus on the bureaucratic challenges associated with ANA organizational structure with regards to processing supply requests. The problems with these challenges can be currently heard from the lowest level units all the way up to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). Slotnick (2016) claimed that from the national down, paper is the primary means of accountability and this had led to a decentralized ineffective system with poor visibility down to the regional zones. Also, Peter (2011) recognized the Western Forces efforts with Afghan counterparts to create a sustainment system capable of making ANA forces more self-reliant. Due to this system requiring Afghan forces to submit the requests through their chain of command, the U.S. has had to endure many challenges with the ANA to overcome hurdles with the signature process. Lere (2016) discussed the requirement of up to 45 signatures to simply remove an item from the property book. Holland (2010) outlines key points expressed by President Barack Obama to the United States Military Academy concerning efforts in Afghanistan. Among President Obama’s goals, he listed one as providing the Combined Security
Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) direct authority to shorten procurement timelines for sustainment acquisitions. Holland (2010) attributes this to realigning and streamlining the ANA’s responsibility in logistics operations.

Rhyne and Thompson (2010) document the successes of sustaining an ANA embedded training team (ETT) within the 203rd Corps region. The team explained that their own internal logistics required as much of their efforts as their actual mentoring mission did. This is important to point out in this research because the team claims that it is easy to accomplish property accountability when conditions are ideal to do so. The ETT identified requirements through implementing a process based on demand analysis as previously discussed in the “pull” system. The team was able to forecast requirements and maintain just enough stock on-hand to meet their needs. The ETT team claimed to accomplish this with simple communications to their higher brigade with the Blue Force Tracker (a multi-million dollar American communications system). Furthermore, the team created .txt files that were readable by the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS). These are capabilities common to American forces, but none of them are utilized by the ANA. The current organizational structure within the ANA still uses hand written and hand carried documents for all requisitions.

Additionally, Hamilton et al., (2014) emphasize the lack of analyzed consumption data by the ANA with programs such as Microsoft Excel. Furthermore, the typical ANA logistics representative does not understand the concept of using these programs to capture and track data, and relies solely on paper and pen for recording ledgers of transactions. Hamilton et al., (2014) claim that subordinate units all receive equal amounts of supplies with no thought process concerning reorder points or the time required to receive supplies. Valeski (2012) also discusses these challenges associated with the decentralization of request generation as ANA logisticsians
Afghan National Army Logistics

are not empowered to establish allocations. In many situations, the MOD logistics officer, as well as, the actual Minister of Defense himself would sign as the approving authority on basic supply requests (Valeski, 2012). This is primarily due to the lack of trust for units to order what they actually need; therefore, approval would require multiple signatures in congruence with the cultural tradition of “shared responsibility”. Basically, more signatures equal a perception of actual need. Moorefield (2013) claims significant U.S. involvement has been required to facilitate change in the ANA’s institutional bureaucracy.

**Accountability.** The final sub-section in this review of the literature concerns property accountability within the ANA, and is closely tied with the previous two sub-sections outlining the ANA’s organizational structure and document processing. The Afghan National Security Forces lacks mission focus, timeliness, and a sense of urgency to provide responsive customer service and logistics support (Foster et al, 2016). Problems with equipment accountability are more likely to occur in remote areas where enemy resistance to GIROA is strong. An example of this is offered in the Kunar province where insurgents consistently attack convoys they believe are carrying supplies (Peter, 2011). Stolen supplies can ultimately be blamed on the ANA as simple mishandling of records as other sources will discuss in later articles. This is further supported by Rose (2012) who reported equipment accountability as troublesome due to witnessing sensitive items going missing from escorted vehicles. In some cases, the entire vehicles were stolen from convoys. In response to this, Krahman (2013) claims the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has employed contracted security support to aide in protecting sustainment convoys in Afghanistan from enemy attacks. Townes (2014) identifies repair parts management as a tough process for the ANA to handle. This particular research claims that the Afghan Ministry of Defense is over-whelmed by the number of form 14’s (supply
requests) for parts that come to the MOD; therefore, the MOD simply pushed what they have or simply did not process the requests. Townes (2014) attributes this to a simple lack of basic understanding for managing repair parts that ultimately resulted in large quantities being stockpiled and unused while requesting units went without needed supplies.

Further contributing problems with accountability are attributed to low literacy rates in Afghanistan. Hamilton et al., (2014) claim that Afghan logisticians will need to begin conducting business practices in a language common to all, and do so with a literacy rate above 30 percent in that language in order to enhance the overall efficiency of the average logistics officers ability. Moorefield (2013) also notes the verbalization of repeated concerns from senior Afghan National Army officers concerning the ANA’s lack of ability to cope with the complex computer technology provided by coalition forces. Weitz (2013) also identifies major weaknesses in the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) extensive equipping program such as an inadequately supported robust logistics program. He identifies a lack of certain qualities such as literacy and management skills within the ANA, and claims they will need better training before being capable of fulfilling their mission. Valeski (2012) also agrees that the current Afghan system depends on literate Soldiers to process supply requests to the higher headquarters for approval. With Afghanistan being a nation consisting of less than a 10 percent literacy rate, the ability to accurately fill out supply requests is limited to a very small number of personnel. Ferris-Rotman (2013) attributes this to the overall perception of the ANA not having the much needed sustainment required for their mission, and supporting NATO’s decision to intentionally leave behind desperately needed equipment as a “gift” for the ANA. These items include armored vehicles and equipment needed to locate and dismantle improvised explosive devices (IED). Lastly, Schwartz (2014) notes the Special Inspector General for Afghan reconstruction
reported that ANA military forces were unable to properly account for an estimated $230 million of spare parts, and then re-ordered an additional $138 million. With regards to the previously mentioned articles in this literature review, one can see how easily something like this could happen.

**Summary of the Literature**

The three sub-sections provided in this review of the literature include organizational structure, document processing, and accountability. Each are linked to the sub-questions provided in Chapter 1. The first sub-question focuses specifically on the Afghan National Army’s organizational structure as it associates with the Central Supply Depot (CSD). The CSD operates as the main distribution center for the entire Ministry of Defense and bears the burden for the successful procurement and distribution of all sustainment needs. Throughout the review of the literature, a common theme is seen concerning many logistical gaps and challenges within the Afghan National Army. Multiple researchers revealed concerns regarding the ANA’s reliance on the U.S. and inability to utilize their own procurement strategy. We also saw many notes concerning the Afghans inability to plan and adjust to the “pull” logistics system being taught by coalition forces. This review exhibited multiple references regarding the lack of an automated system, or even literate soldiers to operate them.

The second Sub-section concerning document processing is closely linked to the second sub-question in Chapter 1 regarding customer satisfaction in the GSB. These studies primarily focus on the Afghan National Army as a whole, and ANASOC’s General Support Battalion (GSB) supports all of the ANA Special forces throughout Afghanistan. Therefore, customer satisfaction throughout all ANA Special Forces will easily correlate with the GSB. The literature concerning document processing is perhaps the most revealing of all when looking at customer
satisfaction. Here, we see many common themes across several reviews regarding the ANA’s pen and ink supply requisition process. Lack of knowledge, availability of computer processing systems, and connectivity is a major hurdle to overcome. Hence, all documents are created by hand and carried to multiple locations throughout MOD to require as many as 10 signatures before receiving final approval. All researchers have identified the need to streamline this process and come up with an Afghan feasible solution.

Lastly, the final section discusses accountability. After reading the previous two sections, it is easy to understand how accountability of equipment can present such a challenge in the ANA. In addition to the aforementioned problems within the ANA’s organizational structure and document processing challenges, accountability is further plagued by illiterate ANA service members who are in a constant state of war with insurgent forces who are targeting supply chains throughout the country. Until these larger systematic issues are dealt with, the number of Afghan Soldiers fielded to support units will have little effect on the ANA’s ability to sustain its current operations if they cannot understand basic concepts and read simple request forms.
Chapter 3: Research Methodology

Research Approach

This chapter details the methodology utilized for assessing the relationship between the Afghan National Army (ANA) Central Supply Depot’s (CSD) organizational structure and customer satisfaction within the ANA’s Special Operations General Support Battalion (GSB). Ultimately, this provided insight into the level of support the GSB could provide to subordinate battalions within the ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC). The major thrust behind this research was to determine if the current organizational structure achieved what it was supposed to. Therefore, the typology utilized consisted of a program evaluation for effectiveness. This approach created an environment conducive for empirically investigating the program’s performance according to specified criteria. Furthermore, this approach evaluated customer satisfaction within the GSB, as well as included performance data explaining how well the ANASOC mission as a whole was being accomplished. Lastly, this research utilized a descriptive quantitative design to provide a complete picture of the characteristics defining the relationship between the CSD and GSB.

The general data collection approach utilized a combination of two instruments for obtaining primary data. These instruments included existing organizational records and scaled surveys. The first instrument consisted of data collection through existing organizational records. Through obtaining and analyzing existing documents from the GSB, this research gained a better understanding for the support provided to the GSB by the CSD. Although this documentation provided substantial measurements in physical substance for determining the level of support provided by the CSD, other data was also required to understand the organizational structure of the CSD and customer satisfaction within the GSB. Hence, the second instrument of primary
data collection consisted of utilizing scaled surveys. Surveys were administered by using the nonprobability sampling technique of purposive sampling. Each participant was selected for a specific purpose, and was restricted solely to those Afghan and U.S. service members who had first-hand experience with the CSD and GSB through their everyday jobs. There are only a select few personnel within the GSB who have knowledge regarding the supply requisition process. The reason for this is deeply rooted in Afghan culture as individual Soldiers are not trusted with high level responsibilities, such as requesting and receiving supplies. Those who were selected to perform these duties are few, and are monitored very closely by their leadership (Valeski, 2012).

**Data Collection Approach and Procedures**

**Data collected.** Through careful examination of the research questions outlined in Chapter 1, this section details the specific data utilized to answer those questions. Only documentation dated in January 2015 through December 2015 was utilized. Complete data before January 2015 did not exist due to the newer establishment of the GSB as an organization during this timeframe.

**Primary research question data details.** Data elements were collected for the independent variable regarding the organizational structure of the Central Supply Depot, as well as, the dependent variable for customer satisfaction within the General Support Battalion. Additionally, data elements defining how the relationship between the aforementioned variables impacted the ANASOC division as a whole were collected. Each of these data elements are outlined and detailed below.

**Research sub-question data details.** The data elements for organizational structure focused on relevant structural characteristics contributing to the effectiveness to which the structure produced desirable or undesirable outcomes. These outcomes were recorded as
Afghan National Army Logistics

witnessed by those who worked directly with the CSD. Also, data elements focused on actual performance levels the organizational structure produced relative to the level required by the General Support Battalion. This includes the approval process that must be accomplished before supplies can be picked-up by the GSB, as well as the actual pick-up process itself.

Assessing customer satisfaction within the GSB commenced by comparing equipment received versus equipment requested from the CSD. These existing organizational records focused primarily on the MOD-14 (Ministry of Defense request for supplies) and the MOD-9 (receipt document). Collection of the MOD-9 and MOD-14 forms included all trips the GSB made to the CSD to pick-up supplies. The MOD-9 and MOD-14 forms were obtained from the GSB support operations office to assist in evaluating the dependent variable of customer satisfaction while conducting business transactions with the CSD.

These records assisted this research effort in evaluating if the GSB was receiving what it was requesting. Once analyzed, these records detailed truth in physical realities for exact supplies received by the GSB. Furthermore, existing records outlining equipment on MOD-9 and MOD-14 forms alone were not substantial to evaluate the GSB’s customer satisfaction with the CSD. These transactions were carried out on hand-written documents that were hand-carried through the supply system, so it was common for paperwork to become lost during the process (Hamilton et al., 2014). Therefore, data was required to represent the personal opinions and experiences of GSB personnel who directly conduct business with the CSD. This data included levels of satisfaction while working with CSD representatives, processing documents, and satisfaction levels concerning the GSB’s ability to successfully pick-up what it had properly requested.

Lastly, data was collected to determine how the GSB’s customer satisfaction and organizational structure within the CSD interacted within ANASOC. To accomplish this, data
was collected for all large scale ANASOC missions conducted throughout Afghanistan during
the 12-month research period. The primary goal for collecting this data was to determine if any
logistics shortfalls were noted where ANASOC units did not have the necessary equipment
needed to conduct operations. These large scale operations typically consisted of multiple units
working across multiple provinces and corps boundaries.

**Data collection procedures.** This section will indicate how the data was collected.

The first requirement was to collect the aforementioned existing records. These paper based
documents were stored in filing cabinets. The existence of the records were verified beforehand,
and maintained within the GSB support operations office located in Kabul, Afghanistan. Based
on the researcher’s personal friendship and working relationship with both the Afghan GSB
commanding officer and Afghan support operations officer, the records were also verified as
accessible. The GSB commander agreed to provide the researcher all documents necessary for
this research, and subsequently delivered on his agreement.

The researcher did not start collecting data before receiving approval through the
Research Review Application (RRA) process. The Afghan GSB commander agreed to provide
the documentation and survey responses prior to the researcher starting the RRA process;
therefore, the data presented in Chapter 4 did not present a challenge to obtain. The GSB did not
have a copy machine available, so the researcher was not able to make copies of the MOD-9 and
MOD-14 forms on-site. The forms had to be collected from the support operations officer and
taken back to the coalition military base for making copies, and then returned to the GSB. The
coalition base was co-located with the Afghan base at the Hamid Karzai International Airport
(HKIA); therefore, location did not hinder the ability to retrieve documentation.
Scaled surveys were utilized to determine the make-up and effectiveness of the CSD’s organizational structure. The purposive sample for survey participants included a mixture of 15 key Afghan and U.S. military personnel directly involved in the supply requisition process. Specifically, these personnel included: the GSB commanding officer, GSB Sergeants Major and American advisor, the GSB Support Operations officer (SPO) and American advisor, the GSB’s liaison officer to the CSD, the GSB’s signature card holder for CLVII major end items, the GSB’s signature card holder for CL V ammunition and CLIX repair parts, the GSB’s signature card holder for CL I (food), CL II (clothing), and CL VI (sundry packs), the GSB signature card authority for CLVIII (medical supplies) and American mentor, the GSB’s signature card holder for CLI (fuel), and CLIV (construction items), and lastly the ANASOC G4 logistics officer and American mentor. These participants served in the rank of captain to colonel. The locations of these officers varied between HKIA, Afghanistan for the GSB respondents, and Camp Morehead, Afghanistan for the ANASOC staff and U.S. mentor respondents.

Lastly, a scaled survey was also utilized to evaluate the relationship between the CSD and GSB interact within ANASOC. In short, the researcher was interested to know if logistics challenges affected missions? This particular survey also consisted of a purposive sample of knowledgeable key staff. These personnel included ten U.S. and Afghan subject matter experts, including the ANASOC special operations advisory group (SOAG) commander, the ANASOC SOAG deputy commander, ANASOC SOAG Sergeant Major, ANASOC SOAG operations officer, and ANASOC SOAG logistics mentor. The Afghan counterpart to each of the aforementioned U.S. mentors received the same survey. Each of these participants were located at Camp Morehead, Afghanistan and the Kabul International Airport. The obtained data here was used to analyze larger scale multi-unit operations involving resupply. Large scale multi-unit
Afghan National Army Logistics

operations were known 30 days in advance; therefore, time was allowed for requisitioning
needed supplies through the CSD. If these ANASOC units required resupply during the mission,
then they were not properly supplied from the CSD to begin with.

**Target Population.** Two scaled surveys were utilized. For the scaled survey regarding
organizational structure of the CSD and customer satisfaction in the GSB, the target population
for this research consisted of 15 personnel within the purposive sample. These personnel
included ten Afghan and five U.S. service members with specific institutional knowledge on the
supply requisition process, and were made up of key leadership and logistics staff from both the
General Support Battalion (GSB) and ANASOC division headquarters as described above.
Within the GSB, key leadership participants included the GSB Commanding officer, GSB
Sergeant Major, GSB Support Operations officer, GSB Central Supply Depot Liaison officer.
The various signature card authorities within the GSB included the officers for major property
book items (CLVII), ammunition and repair parts (CLV and CLIX), food, clothing, and personal
items (CLI, II, and VI), medical supplies (CLVIII), and construction material (CLIV). From the
ANASOC Division Headquarters, the G4 logistics officer, and assigned U.S. mentors were
surveyed.

The second scaled survey regarding how the independent and dependent variables
affected ANASOC missions consisted of 10 U.S. and Afghan subject matter experts, including
the ANASOC special operations advisory group (SOAG) commander, the ANASOC SOAG
deputy commander, ANASOC SOAG Sergeant Major, ANASOC SOAG operations officer, and
ANASOC SOAG logistics mentor. The Afghan counterpart to each of the aforementioned U.S.
mentors also received the same survey, and can be referenced in the appendices section on page
67.
**Sample Details.** This research was intentionally non-random in the selection of data sources. Individuals were selected who would yield the most purposeful information concerning the topic. Due to the small target population, this research sampled the entire target population of 15 personnel. These 15 personnel included key leadership within the GSB, as well as, ANASOC Headquarters consisting of both Afghan and U.S. service members. This purposive sample was made up of only those who had specific organizational knowledge on supply requisition procedures. The Afghan personnel included the GSB Commander, GSB Sergeant Major, GSB Support Operations officer, ANASOC G4 logistics officer, GSB central supply depot liaison officer, and GSB signature card authorities. Additionally, the U.S. mentor who worked with each of the aforementioned Afghans were included in the sample.

The reason this research focused on a purposive sampling technique arose in the necessity to restrict samples to only those Afghan and U.S. service members who had first-hand experience with the CSD and GSB through their everyday jobs. There are only a select few personnel within the GSB who had knowledge on the supply requisition process with the CSD. As referenced previously, the reason for this is deeply rooted in Afghan culture as individual soldiers are not trusted with high level responsibilities such as requesting and receiving supplies. Those who are selected to perform these duties are few. The U.S. mentors are personal business associates of the researcher, and had agreed to complete the surveys beforehand.

**Instrumentation.** All data collection instruments in this research are included as appendices. This research utilized two forms of instrumentation to obtain primary data. These forms included existing organizational records and scaled surveys. Surveys for this research were created specifically for this particular research, and pre-existing surveys were not utilized. These surveys were been tested for validity by three representatives of the directorate of national
logistics. Two of the personnel advise Afghan National Army (ANA) counterparts, and the third person was an Afghan interpreter. Positive feedback regarding the clarity and understandability of the survey items was provided by all three individuals. The survey design was formatted with Likert scaled questions to allow for quantitative analysis. Additionally, open-ended questions were included to capture and further emphasize any missed information. Consent forms for all human subjects, and organizational permission forms were also included as appendixes.

**Procedures.** The researcher developed professional relationships with all respondents in the aforementioned purposive sample while deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom as a U.S. Logistics advisor to the Afghan National Army. There was no supervisor-subordinate relationship role between the researcher and respondents. This research ensured there was no coercion to participate by informing participants of the nature of the study to be conducted and then giving them the choice of either participating or not participating. Furthermore, participants were told that if they agreed to participate, they could choose to withdraw from the study at any time.

In order to prevent potential retaliation based on survey responses, no information was presented in ways that divulge the identities of participants. The researcher kept the nature and quality of individual participants’ performance strictly confidential. Furthermore, to ensure the protection of human subject information, all returned surveys were kept under lock and key. Once data collection was aggregated, surveys were destroyed. Surveys were conducted using paper-based surveys for all Afghan respondents and hand-carried to them at their place of duty by the researcher. Furthermore, Drop boxes were utilized for the receipt of surveys. This allowed the researcher to personally protect anonymity. Camp Morehead had a drop box in the personnel office for U.S. respondents, and a drop box in the Afghan support operations center for Afghan
respondents. For respondents at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), there was be a drop box in the Directorate of Logistics Operations (DLO) for U.S. respondents to utilize, and a drop box in the GSB support operations office for Afghan participants to utilize. The researcher personally collected survey responses from the aforementioned locations. The researcher had an interpreter on site to answer any questions if needed. Given the personal relationships with each respondent and small purposive sample, a 100% return rate was received for all surveys. No incomplete surveys were expected, but in the event that occurred, incomplete responses to survey questions would have been coded with a neutral identifier to ensure unanswered questions did not skew statistical analysis.

**Timing.** Data collection did not commence before application approval; however, documents and data were only collected for the period of January 2015 – December 2015.

**Proposed Approach for Data Analysis and Synthesis**

Descriptive statistics was utilized to prepare the collected data for interpretation. Statistical measures of central tendency included were the mean and mode for Likert scaled item analysis to describe what the sample looked like once the data was collected. Additionally, standard deviation was utilized to measure the variability of responses. The coding scheme strategy for Likert scaled surveys was conducted by associating values from 1 to 5 in accordance with the provided responses. Specifically, every time a participant answers with “strongly disagree”, the answer was associated with a numeric value of 1. When the answer provided was “disagree”, the associated numeric value was 2. For “neutral” answers, the numeric value was 3. For “agree” answers, the associated numeric value was 4. Lastly, answers for “strongly agree” were coded with the number 5. Three separate coding schemes were utilized to triangulate the survey results. The second two coding schemes were conducted in the same manner as the
previously mentioned coding scheme; however, different numeric values were associated with the participant’s responses for statistical analyses. Open-ended questions were analyzed from a thematic perspective. Negative responses received lower numeric values and positive responses received higher values. This allowed for coding schemes in both surveys to follow the same strategy. Additionally, a frequency table was utilized to structure open-ended questions. This allowed the researcher to comment on emerging themes in the data.

Surveys were validated through face validity, content validity, and construct validity. This allowed the researcher to measure particular characteristics within the data while ensuring a sufficient representative sample of the content was analyzed. These characteristics included fill rate percentages, month supplies were requested and received, and the supply class being requested. Lastly, this ensured characteristics that could not be directly observed were also included in the data analysis. These included personal experiences and opinions from those who actually conducted supply transactions with the Central Supply Depot. Validity was then demonstrated with a table of specifications consisting of a two-dimensional grid listing the specific topics and behaviors that reflected achievement in each domain.

Data collected from MOD-14 supply requests and MOD-9 receipt documentation from existing data was used to determine if the current supply requisition process was effective. If the data collected suggested the program was not effective, then recommendations would have been made based on the analysis of the data. Additionally, data was organized with the use of a frequency table and bar graphs to illustrate data trends from the findings. Through this analysis, the researcher gained an objective characterization of the current supply requisition process. If any significant disagreements would have been found between participant responses and the program’s scoring criteria, the researcher would investigate as a possible area of ineffectiveness.
Survey questions in this research were structured for the purpose of allowing multiple comparative analysis, bar graph representations, and percentile data compilations. This research anticipated a total number of 25 completed survey responses, and an unknown quantity of MOD-9 and MOD-14 organizational documents. Therefore, standard descriptive statistical methodologies sufficed for the analysis. Furthermore, the ordinal data utilized for this single group sample fell within a non-normal distribution and were nonparametric statistics. Through careful analysis of the survey responses and supply receipt documents, this study determined facets of the programs overall effectiveness. The researcher then compiled recommendations for the target population for the possible implementation of future adjustments.

Methodological Limitations

There are several factors that limited this research including sample size, reliability of existing records, and possible presence of bias. First, the small sample size consisted of 15 personnel selected to be questioned as survey participants was limited by the number of those who possessed institutional knowledge on the subject matter under study. Secondly, as noted in the review of the literature, hand-carried documentation often became lost during the cumbersome signature process and did not always make it back to the GSB for filing. This research was limited to analyzing only the records that were provided through the GSB support operations office. By collecting a year’s worth of these records, the researcher captured a sample that was large enough to represent the organization as a whole. Furthermore, Afghan survey participants were read the survey questions by an interpreter when requested. The interpreter explained the meaning of the questions and how to answer the scaled responses. The official language in Afghanistan is Dari. A certain amount of meaning is typically always lost when
translating from English to Dari; therefore, the possibility existed for the participant to not fully understand the question. Lastly, the researcher has worked intimately with Afghan logistics for an extended period of time while deployed as an advisor. Although bias is well understood in accordance with McGraw-Hill (2013), preconceived notions of results still existed.
Chapter 4: Data Analysis

The intent behind this research project was to determine if the organizational structure of the Afghan National Army Central Supply Depot (CSD) created an environment conducive to customer satisfaction in the special operations General Support Battalion (GSB). The researcher utilized a descriptive quantitative design in support of this effort to better understand customer satisfaction regarding the support provided to the GSB by the CSD. The primary data within this research was collected by utilizing two instruments consisting of existing organizational records and scaled surveys.

The existing organizational records included a one-year supply of paper-based requisitions (MOD-14) and supply receipts (MOD-9) from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015. A total of 141 supply requisitions were collected from the GSB’s existing organizational data. The survey response rate was 100% for the purposive sample consisting of 25 key personnel within the Afghan Special Forces leadership and their coalition advisors. The aforementioned collected data is presented in this chapter in both visual and text formats. Associated analysis was used to link the data to the research questions. Conflicts, relationships, and corroboration among and between the variables are also discussed and analyzed in this chapter.

Data Presentation and Analysis

In terms of the primary research question regarding the relationship between the CSD’s organizational structure and customer satisfaction in the GSB, data presented in this section pertains to the independent variable of the CSD’s organizational structure. Also presented is data concerning the dependent variable for customer satisfaction in the GSB. Charts and narratives are incorporated to analyze data elements defining how these variables impact operations within
the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) throughout the entire country of Afghanistan.

The first sub-question focuses on the factors comprising the CSD’s organizational structure. The data elements presented in Figure 2 depict structural characteristics relevant to contributions toward the effectiveness of the CSD’s structure to produce certain outcomes either desirable or undesirable. These outcomes were recorded for personnel working every day in a direct capacity with the CSD. Additionally, data elements also focused on performance levels produced by the organization as it relates to the actual level of performance needed by the GSB. Among the processes included in these particular data elements were the receiving process, signature approval process, knowledgeable staff, and questions regarding structure as it relates to successful outcomes.

Figure 2. Mean and standard deviation for CSD organizational structure survey results

Figure 2 depicts the mean and standard deviation for participant responses regarding the CSD. Across all 12 questions in the survey regarding the CSD, the average response rate tended
to be fairly negative with ranges in means from 2.2 to 2.8 respectively. Questions 2, 3, and 12 exhibited the lowest averages with means of 2.3, 2.4, 2.2 shown in Table 1. This indicated levels of frustration with the timeliness of receiving requisition approval at the CSD, receiving all of the supplies requested on the MOD-14, and overall satisfaction with conducting supply transactions at the CSD. Therefore, recommendations presented in chapter five will focus on these concerns, as opposed to questions 7, 8, and 9 where average responses were 3.4 and higher.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean / Average</th>
<th>STD DEV</th>
<th>Mean - STD DEV</th>
<th>2 x STD DEV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. effectiveness</td>
<td>2.866666667</td>
<td>1.203698</td>
<td>1.662968661</td>
<td>2.40739601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. timeliness</td>
<td>2.333333333</td>
<td>1.074967</td>
<td>1.258365634</td>
<td>2.1499354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. receives all</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.143095</td>
<td>1.256904787</td>
<td>2.28619043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. convenience</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.166190</td>
<td>1.633809621</td>
<td>2.33238076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. knowledgeable staff</td>
<td>2.933333333</td>
<td>1.062492</td>
<td>1.870841503</td>
<td>2.12498366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. helpful staff</td>
<td>2.666666667</td>
<td>1.074967</td>
<td>1.591698967</td>
<td>2.1499354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. good results</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.143095</td>
<td>2.256904787</td>
<td>2.28619043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. vital to mission</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. successful structure</td>
<td>3.466666667</td>
<td>0.956847</td>
<td>2.509819994</td>
<td>1.91369335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. satisfying support</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.275408</td>
<td>1.924591569</td>
<td>2.55081686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. relationship</td>
<td>2.666666667</td>
<td>0.869227</td>
<td>1.797439679</td>
<td>1.73845397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. challenges</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.541602</td>
<td>1.65839744</td>
<td>1.08320512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: CSD Survey Questions

For question 8 regarding the importance of the CSD’s role in the mission of the GSB, a mean of 4.4 and standard deviation of 0.8 was observed. These results were not in the same distribution as the other survey responses, and have a very high response exceeding the maximum of 5 when the standard deviation is included. The distance from the most extreme response of 4.4 to the next closest response of 3.46 is almost the same as the range between 4.4 and 3.46. This is a full measure away indicating a clear significance for the importance of the
Survey participants clearly understood the importance of the CSD’s role regarding the mission success of the GSB. Although responses trended negative, participants in this survey revealed the most frustration with the amount of time it took to receive approval for supply requisitions, as well as actually receiving all of the supplies requested from the CSD. This frustration leads to the overall discontentment with requisitioning supplies at the CSD as exhibited in question 12. The challenges associated with the MOD-14 approval process discussed in Chapter 2 are further confirmed in this survey and represent a friction point within the system where further review and attention from leadership could not only benefit the GSB, but the entire Afghan national Army as well. Furthermore, these results confirmed the requisitions that were not received by the GSB. These items were originally reflected in the existing MOD-14 and MOD-9 fill rate data. By placing coalition mentors in the CSD, assistance can be provided throughout the approval and pick-up process to ensure requesting units are receiving all approved supplies on their requests in a timely manner.

The second sub-question focused on the dependent variable in regards to customer satisfaction. Customer satisfaction was assessed by comparing existing organizational records from the GSB in the form of requests (MOD-14) and receipt (MOD-9) documentation. Figure 3 represented the 141 total requisitions for each class of supply represented in the sample. The comparison of the MOD-9’s and MOD-14’s assisted the researcher with evaluation of whether or not the requisitions made by the GSB were actually being fulfilled by the central supply depot. These 141 requisitions helped the researcher to gain a clearer understanding of the physical reality for fill rate percentages as shown in Figure 4. However, it was not uncommon for
these forms to become lost in the supply system due to the fact that they were hand-carried documents and not automated.

![Observed Frequency by Class](image)

*Figure 3. Cylinder graph depicting 141 total requisitions represented in the sample by class.*

As shown in Figure 3, a total of seven classes of supply were represented in the 141 collected supply requests. Class 2 consists of individual clothing items. Class 3 consists of fuel such as diesel, propane, and mogas. Class 5 includes all ammunition stocks. Class 7 is made up of the major end items such as vehicles, helicopters, and armored vehicles. Class 8 is medical supplies, and class 9 includes all repair parts. The three classes of supply that were not represented were class 1 food items, class 4 construction equipment, and class 10 commercial items. The items not represented did not negatively affect this research as those classes have already completely transitioned to the Afghan National Army, and are no longer advised by Coalition Forces. Also of importance to measuring customer satisfaction was to consider the data previously discussed and represented in Figure two. The researcher considered the experiences and opinions of those Afghan personnel who actually processed these documents with the CSD of high importance due to their levels of experience with the supply and requisition process.
Figure 4. Monthly fill rate percentages representing 141 total requisitions

Upon review of the fill rate percentages by month for all MOD-14 and MOD-9 organizational data, the rate at which the requests were filled dropped significantly in June. Then in August, the fill rate begins to recover before beginning to exhibit a downward trend in October. The researcher utilized this monthly fill rate data for the purpose of reviewing supply requisition success over the course of the year. The goal in doing this was to identify possible trends in the data, and consider factors within the Afghan logistics system leading to these trends. In this particular representation of the data shown in Figure 4, the significant drop in fill rate percentages in June after five consecutive months of high fill rates was an obvious indicator of an area that required further analysis. These drops in fill rate percentages upon entering the summer months indicate a struggle within the CSD to meet current demands outside the central Kabul area in the regional logistic nodes throughout Afghanistan.

The researcher’s thoughts on why fill rates would drop in this manner during the summer months is based in the yearly Taliban offensive that typically begins each summer when Taliban
Afghan National Army Logistics

Forces receive their funding from poppy harvests in the Helmand province. As the Taliban commenced summer offensive attacks throughout the country, more supplies were consumed by the regular Afghan National Army, as well as Afghan Special Forces. Ultimately, the increased operations tempo placed a strain on the national level logistics nodes in Kabul to meet the demand of the warfighters on the ground. Additionally, the researcher noted implications for the temporary recovery exhibited in August indicated an increased oversight by coalition forces push more logistics packages consisting of weapons and ammunition into the fight. The researcher’s considerations regarding how the Taliban’s yearly offensive could possibly place a seasonal strain on theater wide Afghan logistics is furthermore supported when supply requests data is reviewed by month as shown in Figure five.

**Figure 5. Supply Requests by Month**

This supply request bar graph depicts the monthly breakdown for all supply requisitions included in the sample. Here, the workload throughout the year is displayed, and slow months can be distinguished from busy months. The line represents the average supply requisitions per month. On an average month, the organization received 11.75 supply requests, and the standard
deviation was 7.37. This is not a normal distribution and not symmetric as the data is right skewed, meaning that some of the high numbers are much further from average than the low numbers. The median of the data is 9. This is lower than the average; therefore, the right skew is confirmed.

The data presented in Figure 5 also indicated there were months where significantly more supply requests were processed, and a mitigation plan could be needed. A possible explanation of the skew could be argued regarding the need for resupply after the summer fighting season. As ANASOC units depleted their resources in the fighting season, a sharp increase in supply requisitions was displayed in the September, October, and November months. This information can be utilized to pace future work flow within the GSB by proactively planning MOD-14 requisitions more aggressively in the months leading up to the summer fighting season.

Fill rate percentages were also reviewed by the researcher to derive other useful information as well. For example, the histogram in Figure six depicts how frequently the GSB received full amounts of requested diesel from the CSD. A total of 23 requisitions were processed for diesel fuel in this sample, and a mode of 200 liters represents the most frequent amount of diesel withheld by the CSD for these 23 requisitions. Why the fuel was withheld, or what was done with this fuel is unknown to the researcher. The mode of the data reflects a .996 fill rate percentage in the histogram with a total of 7 occurrences observed. Because requests included different amounts of diesel on nearly every trip, the distribution of diesel fuel fill rates reflects the different proportion of the 200 liter withholding.
Figure 6. Class III diesel fuel histogram depicting results of 23 requisitions

A mean of 186.9 represents the arithmetic average for liters of diesel withheld by the CSD, and the mean for fill rate is .994 percent in the histogram. One standard deviation equals 44.7 for diesel fuel withheld by the CSD. This standard deviation is also represented by a .0072 fill rate percentage. With a median of 200 liters (.996 fill rate percentage equivalent), the skew in this histogram is attributed to the differing amounts requested for each requisition. Of key note within this data, is that only one of the 23 trips to the CSD yielded a 100% fill rate for the amount of requested diesel. No matter how much fuel was requested, the CSD consistently withheld 150-250 liters of diesel. Therefore, to maximize received quantities and minimize liters withheld by the CSD, the coalition advisors would need to consider options for fuel pick-ups that maximized fuel received by the GSB versus fuel withheld by the CSD.

Lastly, data collected for the third sub-question examined how the previously discussed independent and dependent variables played a role in affecting theater wide special operations throughout the entire country of Afghanistan. The purpose for collecting this particular data presented in Figure seven was to determine if the GSB’s inability to be properly resupplied from the CSD led to shortfalls of the mission critical equipment needed to conduct operations. These
combined operations typically consisted of Afghan Special Forces units working in conjunction with conventional Afghan National Army (ANA) units across regional boundaries.

![Major Combined Operations Diagram](image)

**Figure 7.** Logistics shortfalls while conducting combined operations

The mean and standard deviation are depicted in Figure 7 for participant responses concerning logistics shortfalls during ANASOC’s larger scale combined operations. Across all seven questions, the average response rate indicated an overall well-equipped fighting force with ranges in means from 1.6 to 2.9 for five questions. This indicated non-agreement concerning the existence of shortfalls and the impacts of those shortfalls as shown in Table two. Questions three and six exhibited the highest averages with means of 3.5 and 3.6, respectively indicating a possible logistics shortfall during the Helmand operation. Specifically, the open-ended answers provided in question six indicated a shortage of 81mm mortar rounds during this mission. Therefore, coalition advisors and ANASOC leadership have several possible considerations regarding the class five resupply capability of the 215th Corps Regional Logistics Supply Depot.
(RLSC) responsible for supporting special operations forces in Helmand. These considerations will be further explored in the recommendations chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labels</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>STD DEV</th>
<th>mean - std dev</th>
<th>2 x std dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Logar</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.538516</td>
<td>1.561483519</td>
<td>1.077032961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Wardak</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.538516</td>
<td>1.561483519</td>
<td>1.077032961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Helmand</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.806226</td>
<td>2.693774225</td>
<td>1.61245155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Kunduz</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.943398</td>
<td>1.956601887</td>
<td>1.886796226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Nangahar</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.538516</td>
<td>1.561483519</td>
<td>1.077032961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Shortfalls</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.663325</td>
<td>2.936675042</td>
<td>1.326649916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Impacts</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.663325</td>
<td>0.936675042</td>
<td>1.326649916</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: CSD Survey Questions

Both Helmand and Kunduz operations exhibited wider ranges in standard deviation than other operations as shown in Table two. The standard deviations were 3.5 and 2.9, indicating that mixed perceptions existed with weaker general consensus. A possible explanation could be that communications from the ground level were not effectively passed to the higher headquarters where the perception was that everything was operating smoothly. As discussed in Chapter two, reporting has always been a common challenge within the Afghan National Army due to illiteracy. Even when subtracting the standard deviation for the max value of 3.5 for Helmand, the numbers were still greater than when the standard deviation was added to the mean for the Logar, Wardak, and Nangahar missions. Therefore, the sentiment between the two are likely to be distinctly different and confirm a problem to be further explored.

In contrast, the standard deviation was greater for the Kunduz mission than any other operation. When comparing the mean of 2.1 and standard deviations of 0.54 with Logar, Wardak, and Helmand, overlap existed and suggested that a possible perception regarding the Kunduz mission was under resourced. The mean minus the standard deviation fell below the mean of Logar, Wardak, and Nangahar suggesting they were under resourced but may not test as
The variation in responses for the Helmand and Kunduz operations suggested a possible need to tighten lines of communication between the Division Headquarters and field units as the standard deviations for these missions offered differing views. As noted in Chapter 2, accurate reporting has proven to be very challenging for ANA forces. Additionally, a more proactive plan for sustainment during operations in areas that are well-known for logistical challenges could be reviewed as a result of this data. For example, the results indicated that the further the mission was from the national capital region, the more negative responses occurred. Whereas, missions that occurred closer to the Kabul region had more positive results.

**Data Analysis Summary**

In order to define the relationship between the GSB and CSD, as well as provide leadership with a clear understanding for how the independent and dependent variables impacted missions in special operations, this research project distributed two descriptive survey instruments to a purposive sample totaling 25 personnel. Each of these key leaders were carefully chosen by the researcher based on their specific knowledge of the subject matter. A total of 25 responses were received, which is a 100% response rate. These 25 responses represented the Afghan Special Forces logistics operations as a whole based on the fact that the GSB served as the receiving and distribution node for all of the ANASOC division. The responses provided within these surveys yielded interesting findings confirming logistics challenges referenced in the review of the literature such as levels of frustration with the timeliness of receiving requisition approval at the CSD, and whether or not the GSB received all of the items they requested from the CSD.
Furthermore, this research utilized existing organizational records from the GSB in the form of supply requests and receipt documentation. A one-year supply of these documents were collected for a total of 141 supply transactions. Upon review of this data, it became apparent that logistics challenges become greater during the seasonal Taliban offensive. The strain on resources from Kabul during the summer months was more than the system could effectively sustain. Also, apparent in the data was that the farther a unit resided from Kabul, then the less likely their supply requisitions would be fulfilled from the CSD. Lastly, as shown with the fuel requests and receipts, possible corruption has been identified.
Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

The content included in this final chapter will summarize the researcher’s review of the initial research questions. Also, conclusions and recommendations from the organizational data collected will be presented in relation to the literature review discussed in chapter two. The goal of this research was to address the following questions:

Primary research question

- What is the relationship between the Afghan National Army (ANA) Central Supply Depot’s organizational structure and customer satisfaction in the General Support Battalion (GSB) belonging to special operations?

Associated sub-questions

- What factors comprise the CSD’s organizational structure within the Afghan National Army?
- What are the primary aspects of the General Support Battalion’s customer satisfaction within ANASOC?
- How does the GSB’s customer satisfaction and organizational structure within the Central Supply Depot interact within ANASOC?

From the conclusions derived, several recommendations will be presented regarding the effectiveness of the central supply depot (CSD) to meet the logistical needs of the General Support Battalion (GSB). Additionally, recommendations will be made regarding the role of the Afghan Ministry of Defense within the requisition process, as well as diesel fuel pick-up recommendations, future work flow within the GSB for requesting supplies, ammunition resupply, and tightening the lines of communication for regional commands located farther from the national capital region of Kabul.
The review of the literature explored the independent and dependent variables for the primary and secondary research questions listed above. The independent variable is the organizational structure of the Central Supply Depot, and the dependent variable is the customer satisfaction within the GSB. Also within the reviewed literature, the researcher uncovered insight to a few re-emerging themes within the Afghan requisition process. These themes included challenges within the organizational structure throughout the component commands responsible for approving supply requests, challenges with the signature process, and maintaining visibility of assets throughout the delivery process. The survey utilized for evaluating the CSD’s organizational structure was needed to gain a clearer understanding of the attitudes for personnel directly responsible for processing these documents, as well as the effectiveness of this process. Finally, the organizational data collected from the GSB provided ground truth in quantitative analysis. This helped the researcher to determine the effectiveness of the system in order to form conclusions and make recommendations to the leadership.

Summary

In summary of the key points noted in chapters two and four, the researcher focused efforts towards the primary research question and associated sub-questions. Through careful examination of the relationship between the CSD’s organizational structure and customer satisfaction in the GSB, the researcher ultimately intended to make a determination on the effectiveness of the CSD. The underlying idea was to determine if the CSD was accomplishing the mission of providing adequate supplies to the GSB. If not, the researcher’s intent was to examine possible reasons for this. If the CSD was, in fact, providing effective logistics to the warfighter, the researcher planned to examine the data collected for making recommendations to strengthen the program.
Major findings from prior research within the literature revealed many problems within the Afghan logistics system. These problems included a lengthy supply system that was prone to a great deal of human error. A large part of this responsibility can be attributed to the system being dependent on Afghan soldiers to properly fill out the paperwork. Also prevalent within the literature was many re-emerging themes regarding the signature approval process and illiteracy rates in Afghanistan that contributed to these challenges. In chapter four, the organizational data from the GSB and scaled surveys were analyzed in terms of the research questions, and allowed the researcher to highlight several different findings.

First, the analysis provided insight regarding the primary research question concerning the relationship between the Afghan National Army (ANA) Central Supply Depot’s organizational structure and customer satisfaction in the ANASOC General Support Battalion (GSB). For this question, the researcher gathered data to analyze the independent variable within this question regarding the organizational structure of the CSD. To accomplish this, a scaled survey was used to assess opinions towards effectiveness, timeliness, receipt of goods, convenience, knowledge of the staff, helpfulness of the staff, results, importance to the mission, successful structure, satisfying support, relationships, and challenges. Across these 12 questions, the results of this survey indicated overall frustration and negativity for timeliness to receive supplies and receiving everything that was requested. Also, overall contentment with conducting these transactions with the CSD was negative.

Second, the researcher utilized existing organizational records from the GSB to compare supply requests and supply receipts. A total of 141 requisitions for a one-year time period were collected in this effort. Of key importance within the analysis of the fill-rate percentages for these requisitions, a significant drop in receiving supplies in the beginning of the summer months
was revealed. The CSD’s inability to support customer units in the summer indicated an obvious area of concern that warranted further investigation by the researcher. A possible explanation for this drop in fill rate percentages is the yearly summer Taliban offensive that usually begins when funds are received from the poppy harvests in the southern regions of Afghanistan.

Finally, the researcher utilized a scaled survey for the purpose of analyzing the third sub-question with regards to how the aforementioned independent and dependent variables affected large scale special operations. The purpose of collecting this particular data was to determine if the CSD’s inability to adequately resupply the GSB ever resulted in mission failure for Afghan Special Forces. The reason this was important was due to the fact the GSB is responsible for providing all emergency resupply required for Afghan Special Forces operations. This survey focused on operations in Logar, Wardak, Helmand, Kundoz, and Nangahar.

Questions regarding shortfalls in supplies and the impacts of these shortfalls were also included in this survey. Major findings indicated an overall well-equipped force; however, logistics shortfalls were apparent in Helmand and Kundoz operations. These shortfalls were primarily ammunition related shortages. The analysis concluded a possible explanation in that Helmand and Kundoz are the only two regions located farther from the national capital region of Kabul where supplies are shipped. Accurate communications from farther distances could contribute to increased challenges with resupply missions requiring greater distances of travel.

**Conclusions**

The facts derived from the data analysis and literature review provide answers to the research questions. Three conclusions were made by the researcher in response to the three sub-questions and will be discussed in this section. Holistically, the combination of these conclusions and responses from the sub-questions provided the researcher with information that supported
the determination for some processes and functions within the CSD, as well as the ministerial department to be considered for reform.

**Sub-question 1: What factors comprise the CSD’s organizational structure within the Afghan National Army?** To answer this question the researcher reviewed all aspects across the spectrum of support provided to the GSB by the CSD. This spectrum included considerations regarding the helpfulness of CSD’s staff to the actual receipt of goods as shown in Figure 2 and Table 1. Scaled survey responses provided in the data analysis proved to be largely negative with particular discontent in the areas regarding the time it takes for the GSB to receive supplies, receiving everything they requested, and overall satisfaction with the requisition process. Although these top three issues were the most problematic, it is important to note that all questions within the survey yielded poor results.

These results agree with the review of the literature as Peter (2011) also recognized the importance of Afghan logistics and establishing the capability to effectively provide resupply. Valeski (2012) pointed out that the Central Supply Depot (CSD) would simply continue to deny customer requests if the logistics doctrine did not provide information regarding the allocation of supplies to the corps. Furthermore, Slotnick (2016) noted that paper was the primary means of accountability from the national down to the corps level. This type of system had ultimately led to ineffectiveness and with poor visibility throughout all levels of the supply process.

**Sub-question 2: What are the primary aspects of the General Support Battalion’s customer satisfaction within ANASOC?** This question was derived from the dependent variable regarding customer satisfaction within the GSB. To answer this question, the researcher relied on existing organizational data from supply requests and receipts from the GSB. The intent was to analyze and evaluate factual data from the GSB to determine if the CSD was fulfilling
requests, or not fulfilling the requests. This data consisted of 141 requests over a one-year time period from 1 January 2015 to 1 January 2016. Fill rate percentages for these requests indicated the CSD was successfully fulfilling the demand for the months of January through May. The CSD struggled to meet the demands in June and July, but recovered very well in August as seen in Figure 4. Even during the least successful months of the CSD, the fill rate percentages exceeded 90% indicating great success on the part of the CSD for the year.

This data is the first ever of its kind, and has never been attempted by previous researchers. This explains why the above referenced fill rate percentages are not supported in any way within the literature review. The literature review is largely completely negative; whereas, this analysis displays a positive result from the CSD to meet the logistics demands in special operations. In the review of the literature, authors only reference what was reported from others. No empirical data was collected from within Afghan units or key organizations, such as the Central Supply Depot (CSD) and General Support Battalion (GSB), where physical forms were studied and referenced to back up their claims.

Sub-question 3: How does the GSB’s customer satisfaction and organizational structure within the Central Supply Depot interact within ANASOC? The answer to this question was that the interaction is largely positive. The researcher utilized a scaled survey to analyze special operations missions in the provinces of Logar, Wardak, Helmand, Kunduz, and Nangahar in order to assess mission shortfalls regarding the required logistics support. Findings revealed positive overall response rates in support of well-equipped soldiers within special operations. The average response rates indicated ranges in means from 1.6 to 2.9; however, the two open-ended questions regarding perceptions of shortfalls and challenges was much higher at 3.5 and 3.6. This showed the researcher that perceptions of logistics shortfalls on these missions
was much higher than what was actually happening on the ground. The only shortfalls found within the data were indicated as ammunition shortfalls in Helmand operations. However, the researcher learned of problems with accurate reporting in provinces farther from Kabul, such as Helmand and Kundoz, and this could be linked to the perception of not being properly supplied during these missions. Peter (2011) also noted problems with the accountability of equipment and supplies in remote areas where Taliban resistance to the government is strong.

**Recommendations**

Based on these conclusions, the researcher has five recommendations for the key leadership within the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) and the Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) responsible for working with ANASOC. The first three recommendations are focused on providing immediate relief for systemic problems within the requisition process, and the final two recommendations target specific concerns with fuel and communications.

**Recommendation 1: Strategically place additional coalition mentors and advisors within the Logistics Command area of operations.** The researcher recommends two additional mentors placed at both the Class II warehouse and Class IX warehouse. Also, one additional mentor should be added at the Material Management Command (MMC) automation office. The Class II warehouse stores mostly clothing items. The key challenge is the items are not stored in the proper locations within the warehouse and subsequently entered into the computer system to match these locations. When the items are not entered into the computer system, the MMC does not have visibility over the warehouse stockage levels and denies customer requests because they believe there is none in stock.
To better assist the Class II warehouse with improving accountability, one additional mentor should be placed in the warehouse for the purpose of checking inventory and locations. The other mentor should be placed with the Afghan responsible for updating the computer system with data received on locations and quantities. Subsequently, the Class IX warehouse should be supported in the same manner as the Class II warehouse. The Class IX warehouse has many more problems than the Class II warehouse with categorizing inventory. However, unlike the Class II warehouse, the Class IX warehouse is also augmented with contracted support so the recommendation remains for two additional mentors. One advisor to assist with inventory and verification of locations, and one advisor to ensure proper data entry into the inventory management computer system.

Lastly, the Material Management Command (MMC) who is co-located with the CSD’s Class II and Class IX warehouses requires one additional mentor for processing the MOD-14 supply requests. As requests come to the MMC for fulfillment, they are often filled out improperly, and this requires the MMC to use certain amounts of discretion when deciding how to best fill the supply requests. By having a trained automation mentor with the Material Management Command’s MOD-14 processors, the requests can be more accurately supported with correct serial numbers from within the computer system.

These five additions for increasing the advising efforts at the CSD’s Class II, Class IX warehouses, and the Material Management Command could payoff largely for Coalition efforts. The result would be more oversight and assistance throughout the entire requisition approval and receipt process, and would ultimately better support the warfighters on the ground. The researcher recommends these additional mentors be attached to the Directorate of National
Logistics (DNL) and begin going on weekly missions with the DNL advising team at the earliest possible convenience.

**Recommendation 2: Automate the MOD-14 requisition process.** Prevalent throughout the literature, as well as the current situation in Afghanistan, these hand-carried documents became lost in the process far too often. The current computer supply system in Afghanistan is commonly known as CoreIMS. CoreIMS displays all shipped and received goods, but is only as accurate as the information typed in. Coalition forces should work with Core partners to add a function for the MOD-14 request document in CoreIMS. This would allow user level requests to be completed online in the system, and then routed through a specific signature process for digital signatures. This would eliminate forms being filled out incorrectly as drop-down menus could be utilized. This would also assist with the forms not being lost since they would be routed digitally through the signature process for various signature approval authorities to sign.

The implementation of automating the requisition process in CoreIMS ultimately requires funding. To do this, Coalition Forces would require a separate contract through Core partners for the purpose of creating a side module in CoreIMS where the modification of forms would be built from the ground up. This contract would also need to include an office support package to assist with any malfunctions and glitches that occurred. Additionally, a service clause would need to be included for modifying any required changes in the system moving forward. When new programs are implemented, it is common for users to identify other required changes after the first few months of use. The estimated costs as defined by the Automated Information Management (AIM) office is estimated in the $200,000 to $300,000 range. Lastly, implementation would require buy-in at the Afghan ministerial level due to the fact that certain
delegation of authorities would be required with determining who would receive signature authority throughout the routing of the requisitions.

**Recommendation 3: Better prepare the Central Supply Depot (CSD) for the Taliban summer offensive.** As shown in Figure 4, The CSD is very effective in fulfilling request until the summer timeframe arrives when the Taliban typically starts their summer campaign. To better prepare the Afghan National Army, the researcher recommends actions be taken to create a winter campaign plan by coalition forces. This winter campaign plan should incorporate efforts from the Directorate of Logistics Operations (DLO) and the Directorate of National Logistics (DNL) offices to create push packages for all six corps commands in Afghanistan.

These logistics push packages will be configured and pushed to the corps prior to the beginning of the Taliban’s summer offensive. These packages would consist primarily of ammunition and CL IX repair parts with the intent of providing immediate supply to the warfighter from the corps level supply depots. With adequate immediate supplies available at the corps level depots, request would not need to be routed to the national capital region of Kabul for follow-on resupply by the National Transportation brigade. The researcher estimates this would cut approximately four weeks of wait time to receive the much needed ammunition and repair parts to support the mission. Furthermore, Figure 5 displayed the high volume of supply requests placed after the fighting season to refill the GSB’s depleted stocks. An immediate increase in supply request is shown for the months of September, October, and November. The GSB’s operations office can utilize this information to plan future work efforts and proactively plan MOD-14 requisitions more intensively prior to the summer fighting season.

**Recommendation 4: The GSB only requests larger amounts of fuel from the CSD.** The GSB made a total of 23 trips to the CSD for the purpose of receiving diesel fuel during the one-year
timeframe that data was collected for this research. As shown in Figure 6, the CSD typically withheld an average of 186.9 gallons while issuing approximately .994 of what the GSB actually requested. The data revealed that the amount requested by the GSB did not affect the amount that the CSD withheld. In order to maximize the quantity of fuel received by the GSB, the researcher recommends fuel pickups to be conducted for one full fuel tanker for each trip to the CSD. These requests should be standardized in the GSB support operations office to ensure continuity with future requests. The researcher does not have knowledge as to why the fuel was withheld, or what the CSD did with the fuel they kept from these transactions.

**Recommendation 5: Increased communications capability in Helmand and Kunduz.**

The differing responses regarding Helmand and Kunduz operations suggested an area of improvement with communications between the ANASOC Headquarters in Kabul and subordinate battalions in these farther regions. As seen in Figure 7, standard deviations for these operations revealed differing views. Consistency in reporting has proven to be very difficult for ANA forces as noted in Chapter two. Results within this research also further confirmed that the further the mission was from the national capital region, the more negative responses occurred. The researcher recommends for ANASOC leadership to gain approval at the ministerial level for the release of communications equipment from the CSD for battalions located in Kundoz and Helmand.

**Future Research Suggestions**

While this research aimed to determine the effectiveness of the Afghan National Army (ANA) Central Supply Depot (CSD) with fulfilling the requirements within special operations, the researcher identified another part of the requisition process outside the CSD’s responsibility where improvement is needed. This particular improvement focuses on requisition approval at
the ministerial level. Supply requisitions require three levels of approval. These levels are regional, national, and ministerial. The MOD-14 requests are generated at the regional levels where battalion sized units reside. If the regional level depot cannot fulfill the request, it then goes to the ministerial level for approval before being pushed to the national level (CSD) for fulfillment and shipment.

Per the Afghan Logistics decree 4.0 Figure 8, requisitions should be sent from the regional level to the national level and not directly to the ministerial level for approval. The problem identified by the researcher is that the Ministry of Defense (MOD) pulled all authority from the national level for approving MOD-14 requests to the ministerial level. This adds weeks to the requisition timeline, and many times the requests are simply lost and never returned to the national level for procurement. Ministerial coalition advisors often note in their daily situational reports that MOD staff view the requests as mere suggestions, and make judgment calls based on intuition with what they decide to actually approve on the requests. Feedback from units who made the requests often state that the supplies approved and pushed are not what was requested or needed in their units to support the mission.
At no point in the Afghan logistics decree does the Ministry of Defense have a role in approving MOD-14 supply requests. This requirement enforced by the ministry adds much uncertainty to the process as a whole. The highest level the requests should go is to the national level where the central supply depot is located. When the Ministry of Defense logistics office makes the decision to deny a request, rarely is any feedback provided back to the regional level where the request originated. There is a due-out process and form required to be sent back to the regional level outlined in the 4.0 logistics decree; however, the ministry does not see the need to utilize this process because they do not feel any feedback is necessary when the decision is to deny the request. Figure 9 depicts the actual process taking place, and the insertion of the ministerial logistics office for approving requisitions.
If the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) refuses to follow their own logistics decree, the researcher recommends additional research into streamlining the approval process in a way that supports the Afghan way. For example, any of the six regional support commands can be used as a test subject to track MOD-14 requests to the ministerial level. Particular aspects for data collection would take into consideration how many of the MOD-14s actually made it from the regional level to the Ministry, and what percentages of the MOD-14s were approved versus denied. Furthermore, the researcher should attempt to define the signature process at the ministry to determine the exact requirements and number of signatures needed before the MOD-14 is sent back down to the national level for fulfilling the requested supplies. Often times when MOD-14s
are sent from the ministry to the national level, it is evident that many signatures on placed on the request with no continuity regarding who approved the request. Once this determination is made, the researcher recommends replicating the data with two other regional commands while including regions that reside in areas located farther from the national capital regions of Kabul.

References

Asfura-Heim, P., Gilmore, D., Mak, D., Meyerle, J., Norman, C., Rosenau, B., Rosen, M., and


Ferris, A. (2013). The long haul: the monumental task of packing up a war. Foreign policy, 32(202), 35-38. doi: 00157228


defense report, 232(36), 4. doi: 01934546

retrieved from http://www.army.mil/article/116640/ANA_use_modern_battlefield_logistics_to供应_their_force/


Stear, A. (2012). The 204th bsb's logistics training advisory team in afghanistan. Army
Sustainment, 44(6), 24-27.

DC Congressional Research Service, 1-29. doi: 7570043566

team. Military Science, 42(4), 3-5. doi: 52411685


Van Dyck, K. (2016). Requisition improvement plan, MOD 14 and CorelMS, Combined Security Transition Command, ANSF LOG DNL, pg.1, 09356


Appendix A – Transmittal Letter / Survey Instructions
Dear Participant:

Thank you for participating in this important survey. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the Central Supply Depot to adequately sustain the General Support Battalion, and also to make recommendations which may lead to enhancements to the program. Your answers will assist current and future key leaders to make informed decisions regarding your organizations supply requisition process.

The attached survey consists of 12 questions that focus on supply requisition as it relates to the General Support Battalion’s ability to successfully receive supplies from the Central Supply Depot. The survey will ask to what level you agree or disagree with a statement and if for some reason you cannot answer a question, simply circle “NA.” The survey will ask you to write in comments for any question that elicits a strong response.

The survey should not take more than 10 minutes to answer. An informed consent form is also included to explain the procedures that will be utilized to maintain confidentiality and to explain other concerns you may have. The individual data collected from these surveys will remain strictly confidential. No one from your organization will see any answers associated with your personal demographic or personal data. Once all of the surveys are collected, the researcher will compile the results, ensure there is no identifying data, and make them available to all participants.

This information is being gathered as part of an individual research paper for William Richardson, a Master’s degree candidate with Central Michigan University: Off Campus Program. The completed research paper and executive summary will be made available to senior coalition members within the U.S. Army.

Please feel free to stop taking the survey at any time you desire if you so wish to. Thank you in advance for your participation and if you have any questions, please contact me at the numbers given below.

If you are not satisfied with the manner in which this study is being conducted, you may report anonymously if you so choose, any complaints to the Central Michigan University MSA program at 989-774-6525 or 1-800-950-1144, ext. *6525.

William J. Richardson
Email address: richa2wj@cmich.edu
Instructor’s Name: Dr. Gordon Elwell
Instructors Email Address: elwellgr@cmich.edu

Appendix B – Survey Questions (CSD Organizational Structure)
Instructions: Do not include your name on this survey. Participation is voluntary. Please answer the questions below by selecting the best answer.

1. Receiving approval at the Central Supply Depot to pick-up supplies is an effective process.

2. Approval for supply pick-up at the Central Supply Depot is done in a timely manner.

3. Once a supply request is approved, the customer receives all requested supplies.

4. The pick-up process at the Central Supply Depot is convenient for customer units.

5. The Central Supply Depot Staff are knowledgeable in their jobs.

6. The Central Supply Depot Staff are helpful to customer units.

7. Going to the Central Supply Depot for supplies typically yields good results.

8. The Central Supply Depot is vital to the GSB’s mission success.

9. The organizational structure of the Central Supply Depot enables successful transactions?

10. Overall, I am satisfied with the support provided by the Central Supply Depot.

Please answer the following questions in the space provided.

11. How would you describe the relationship between the CSD and GSB? Please list any behaviors, characteristics, or any other items you feel best describes interactions with the CSD.

12. What are some of the challenges you have experienced in working with the CSD during the approval and pick-up processes?

Survey Questions (Interaction with Larger Scale ANASOC Missions)
Instructions: Do not include your name on this survey. Participation is voluntary. Please answer the questions below by selecting the best answer.

1. During 14-18 August 2014, ANASOC encountered logistical shortages during the Logar mission.

2. During 9-12 September 2014, ANASOC encountered logistical shortages during the Wardak mission.

3. During 27 September – 2 October 2014, ANASOC encountered logistical shortages during the Helmand mission.

4. During 4-15 November 2014, ANASOC encountered logistical shortages during the Kundoz mission.

5. During 27 November – 2 December 2014, ANASOC encountered logistical shortages during the Nangahar Paktia mission.

Please answer the following questions in the space provided.

6. For any responses selected above as “agree” or “strongly agree”, please describe to the best of your knowledge the nature of the logistical shortfall.

7. To the best of your knowledge, did the logistical shortfalls referenced in question 6 have a negative impact on the mission?

Appendix C – Permission to Conduct Study
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND, AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
(DSN) 318-448-5739
AFG, AE 0836

CSTC-A SA-EF5.1-DNL  15 August 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR CENTRAL MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

SUBJECT: Approval for Major Richardson, William J. (ID # 538249) to Conduct Research in Support of MSA 699 Foundations of Research Methods in Administration

1. I have reviewed your request to conduct a Program Evaluation of Afghan Logistics involving the Central Supply Depot and General Support Battalion. You are hereby granted permission to conduct surveys of personnel and collect existing organizational data including MAD-14 supply requests and MCD-9 supply receipts. I feel that this project will be beneficial to leadership in the Directorate of National Logistics (DNL). You have my permission to proceed with the distribution of surveys, and the collection of the aforementioned existing organizational data for this project. There are no stipulations for gathering this required data.

2. Questions or concerns regarding this request may be sent directly to the undersigned at j.royomartinez.esp@afghan.swa.army.mil or DSN 318-448-5739.

JUAN CARLOS ROYO MARTINEZ
Colonel, ESP Army
Director of National Logistics

Appendix D – Approval Email, Research Review Application (RRA)
On Tuesday, August 23, 2016 12:17 AM, "Prout, Christina Leigh" <prout1cl@cmich.edu> wrote:

Dear William,

Your Research Review Application has been reviewed and approved. You may start your data collection. This approval will not expire as long as your topic and methodology remain unchanged. If your topic or methodology changes, please submit a new Research Review Application and supporting documents to your instructor by e-mail.

Please contact your instructor if you have any questions. Also, be sure to check with your instructor concerning the due dates for your project.

Good luck with your project. This is the only notification you will receive. Please keep a copy for your records.

Kim Gribben
Assistant Director, MSA Program

Christina Prout
Administrative Secretary Master of Science in Administration Program Rowe 222
Central Michigan University | Mount Pleasant, MI 48859 (:989-774-65256:Fax 989-774-2575 1-800-950-1144, ext. 6525 *:prout1cl@cmich.edu < Caution-mailto:prout1cl@cmich.edu > 8:Visit us online < Caution-http://www.grad.cmich.edu/msa > !

WARNING: This message (including any attachment) may contain confidential information and is intended only for the individual(s) named. Please do not distribute, copy, or forward this e-mail without the permission of the sender. Please notify sender if you have received this e-mail by mistake and delete it from your system. Thank you.